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ABSTRACT	  
 
This paper presents an analysis of the underlying policy and legal mechanisms 
contributing to the deaths of migrants attempting to reach the EU by crossing the 
Mediterranean. It is structured into three sections, outlining, firstly, the deficits of the 
current Common European Asylum System, especially its extraterritorial dimension. 
It is argued that the reasons for the shortcomings of the current system are linked to 
the traditional state-centred paradigm still pre-dominant in EU law and policy. 
Secondly, human rights are presented as the conceptually adequate instrument to fill 
these gaps and to extend effective protection of migrants’ human rights beyond the 
shores of Europe. The European Convention of Human Rights is singled out as the 
most promising system for doing so. Thirdly, analysing the role of the two major 
European Courts in extending human rights protection extraterritorially, it further 
outlines the prospects and limits of such an approach. The importance of the Courts in 
clarifying and also extending the reach of human rights protection is demonstrated 
and the paper concludes with an outlook on future challenges facing the two Courts 
and the human rights system within the European region.    
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INTRODUCTION	  
 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” - Article 2 TEU 
 “The art is to translate the rhetoric of human rights protection into a working reality that is 
commensurate with human dignity, compatible with international obligations and consistent with the 
rule of law.” - Goodwin Gill (2008)  
The	  Context	  
 
This thesis deals with the increasingly relevant and visible problem of migrants 
drowning in the Mediterranean Sea while trying to reach Europe. Within the final 
three weeks of writing this paper, over 1000 migrants died in this manner. Over the 
last decade the estimated number of deaths is around 20’000 (IOM, 2014). 2014 has 
been the deadliest year on record with more than 3500 individuals drowning or dying 
of hunger, thirst or cold during the crossing and 2015 promises to be even worse. 
After a particularly dramatic incident off the coast of Lampedusa in 2013, Italy started 
a major search and rescue operation, Mare Nostrum. However, due to the financial 
burden and lack of support by other European states, this program was ended in 
October 2014. Its replacement, Joint Operation Triton (JO Triton), has a much 
narrower focus on securing the border and not on saving lives.1 This has led to a 
situation in which an increasingly large number of people are in danger of drowning 
en route to Europe, without effective access to asylum and protection. This comes at a 
time when the number of refugees and migrants is expected to grow substantially, 
mainly due to the deteriorating situation in the Middle East (UNHCR, 2014). This 
increase is reflected both in the number of asylum applications lodged within the EU 
(see Graph Annex 1) and the reported irregular border crossings. According to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 This has recently been made explicit again by the head of the European Border Agency: „EU borders 
chief says saving migrants' lives 'shouldn't be priority' for patrols” (Guardian, 2015)  
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Frontex, there were about 278,000 irregular border crossings in 2014, twice as many 
as in 2011 (Frontex, 2014). 
 
The European Union has met this larger influx with increased border controls, so 
called “push-back” operations pushing back migrant boats, and other increasingly 
extraterritorial mechanisms such as third country agreements (“pull-back” 
agreements) to hold back migrants, e.g. with Morocco or Libya, and increased 
obligations on airlines to control visa. These operations have been criticised by human 
rights NGOs for violating the principle of non-refoulement and violating other human 
rights of migrants (Amnesty International, 2014). Politicians have been very reluctant 
to accept responsibility for the fate of migrants on the high seas, due to a general 
rising anti-immigration sentiment within Europe (viz. Guiraudon and Lahav, 2013, 
Davidov et al, 2014). However, the European Courts, most notably, the European 
Court of Human Rights, have been quite active in establishing the rights of refugees 
on the high seas and the corresponding state duties. Nevertheless, there are limitations 
to what the courts can and will most likely do. The one thing that is clear in this 
complex dilemma is that the current system fails to protect the basic human rights of 
migrants. The overarching question of this thesis is thus: What are the deficiencies 
in the protection scheme offered by the EU to migrants, on which legal basis could 
these gaps be filled and what is the role of the Courts in filling these gaps?  
 
Overview	  of	  the	  Argument	  
 
This thesis seeks to tackle the problem by analysing the structural reasons behind 
migrants’ deaths at sea with a special focus on the legal framework and the role of the 
European Courts (hereafter often “The Courts”). It proceeds in a three-step analysis 
and argumentation: 
 
1. The paper outlines the salient features of the current EU asylum system with a 
focus on extraterritorial asylum measures. It identifies gaps and shortcomings in 
the current policy framework, which are rooted in the legal framing of refugee 
rights more generally. These pertain mostly to the underlying territoriality of the 
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protection scheme, which does not include migrants at sea. Moreover, it is argued 
that the extension of jurisdiction and state responsibility by Strasbourg in its Hirsi 
judgment may have created perverse incentives against rescuing refugees. The 
move from Mare Nostrum to JO Triton can arguably be explained against this very 
background. In any case, it is clear that current search and rescue provisions based 
on the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) are 
insufficient in providing effective access to asylum and protection of basic human 
rights of migrants, such as the right to life. 
 
2. The paper asks which instrument would be most promising to fill these gaps, also 
taking into account the limitations arising from the instruments themselves and 
their application and interpretation by the Courts. The argument is advanced that 
human rights instruments promise the best solution to the situation of migrants at 
sea as these individuals are often outside the jurisdiction of any state. The Charter, 
the ECHR and international conventions are analysed as potential candidates and 
the ECHR singled out as the most promising instrument to offer such protection 
with clear limitations.  
 
3. The paper asks what role the Courts have played in advancing refugee right 
protection and human rights protection for migrants more generally.2 It uses the 
analytical tool of looking at the dialogue of the Courts between themselves and 
with Civil Society and EU institutions, to assess how progressive the Courts have 
been and indeed could be. This section will also argue that there are limits to what 
the Courts can establish but that the Courts have a crucial role to play in 
supervising the rapidly developing external dimension of European asylum policy. 
Ultimately, the decisions will emanate from the political realm, as the current 
interpretation of the legal instruments does not provide for a clear establishment of 
a positive duty to search and rescue migrants. Humanitarian arguments and ethical 
imperatives will have to be brought to bear on governments from other actors, as 
the Courts are limited by a legal system still restricted by its Westphalian roots.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 Refugees and migrants are entitled to different schemes of protection, however, as the focus lies on 
extraterritorial protection, this distinctiion has not yet been established and hence the protection offered 
to mixed migration flows is analyzed. 
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The	  Methodology	  
 
The European extraterritorial asylum system is failing to control migration and to 
provide effective access to asylum. This paper is based on a problem-driven, inter-
disciplinary analysis of this failure. Such an approach has been applied to various 
governance dilemmas and failures and has been developed significantly in the context 
of global economic policy analysis (The World Bank, 2009). This method follows a 
number of clear steps: 
 
i. “Identifying the problem, opportunity or vulnerability to be addressed 
ii. Mapping out the institutional and governance arrangements and weaknesses 
iii. Drilling down to the political economy drivers, both to identify obstacles to 
progressive change and to understand where a ‘drive’ for positive change could 
emerge from” (ibid. ix). 
 
This approach has yielded good results and is the methodology underlying many 
policy analyses. The present thesis has adapted this method to reflect the focus on the 
legal framework underlying the problem and proceeds as follows: 
 
i. Identifying the problem to be addressed within the European extraterritorial 
asylum system with a focus on the legal reach of protection for refugee rights. 
ii. Mapping out the legal governance arrangements and weaknesses by analysing the 
potential and limitations of different legal governance regimes. 
iii. Drilling down to the key actors, the European Courts, both to identify obstacles to 
progressive change and to understand where a ‘drive’ for positive change could 
emerge from. 
 
It is argued that a transposition of this problem driven methodology is well suited to 
the problem at hand as it spans different disciplines. The method is based on a systems 
approach to policy problem analysis (e.g., Stewart and Ayres, 2011), arguing that the 
task of public policy scholars and practitioners is to understand the complexity 
underlying real world problems and approach them from a required inter-disciplinary 
perspective. Protection of migrants’ human rights and refugee rights not only requires 
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an understanding of policy questions, but also a sound understanding of the legal 
structures within which solutions are sought and suggested. By using legal analysis 
both in primary and secondary form and by focusing on dialogue between the Courts 
and other policy actors, this paper seeks to advance a broader and better-informed 
understanding of the underlying reasons for migrants’ deaths in the Mediterranean.  
 
Regarding the legal analysis of the human rights instruments, this paper is situated 
between the “legal reform research” and “expository legal research” (closer to the 
“reform” side), using Arthurs’ classification of different legal research types (Arthurs, 
1983). Due to the problem focus, the thesis both analyses the reach of different legal 
instruments while arguing that this is in some cases insufficient or has been 
interpreted in a way that leaves migrants without effective protection and access to 
asylum. The thesis aims to be useful for public policy scholars and policy makers in 
understanding the legal framework, so the constituency is the professional world, with 
only a few selected forays into theoretical debates. 
 
Figure 1: Legal Research Styles (Arthurs, 1983)  
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Lastly, a brief word on terminology: migration studies is beset with terminology 
issues. In the public sphere, the terms “foreigners”, “aliens”, “migrants”, “refugees”, 
and “asylum-seekers” are often used interchangeably even though they denote 
different groups who are entitled to different levels of protection. This study will use 
the term “refugee” as shorthand for all persons entitled to international protection (as 
den Heijer, 2012) and the more general term “migrant” when referring to migrating 
individuals whose protection status has not yet been determined. 
 
Theoretical	  Context	  &	  Debates	  
 
The thesis touches upon many important theoretical debates. Two of them will be 
briefly outlined here to position the paper more clearly.  
 
Firstly, this is a case study for the limitations of an international legal system based on 
a territorial understanding of state responsibility and also ultimately of rights. This 
challenges the key promise of human rights as rights individuals have simply by 
virtue of being human. The vulnerable migrant on the high seas embodies this deficit 
in the international legal order and her situation questions our notion of state 
responsibility and the focus on inter-state regulation. “The protective duty of a state is 
not self-evident in the absence of a territorial linkage between the individual and the 
state” (den Heijer, 2012: 6). This paper shall outline this fundamental challenge but 
also show the potential of human rights frameworks in remedying this shortcoming. 
Nevertheless, it is currently not likely that Courts will interpret the requirements of 
these human rights documents to entail a positive obligation to assist migrants beyond 
the territorial waters. The philosopher Immanuel Kant specified the duty to aid others 
as an “imperfect duty”, as it was not fully specified and lacked correlative rights (Viz. 
Gregor, 1986). The logic seems to be inverted here and it would be appropriate to 
describe the human rights of migrants as “imperfect rights” as they lack the 
correlative duty of states to protect these rights. Thus, a wide-scale search and rescue 
operation as demanded in the European Parliament at the time of writing, would be 
based on a humanitarian and ethical rationale. Humanitarianism insists that extreme 
situations give rise to “special responsibilities” (Gibney, 1999: 44). However, in the 
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long run, humanitarian concerns cannot compensate for the conceptual gaps in 
refugee rights and institutional reform is needed to grant the right to have rights to 
migrants (Heuser, 2007). 
 
Secondly, the ethical debate about competing moral claims in the field of immigration 
provides the background against which this analysis proceeds. The essential question 
here is what is owed to people outside one’s own political community, especially to 
those in special need of protection. Taking a strong communitarian view, rights stem 
from a particular political community and the members of this community take 
priority over outsiders (e.g., Walzer, 1983). In contrast, global impartial liberalism 
sees human rights as universal and rejects the priority view, according migrants 
effectively the same rights and status as citizens of a particular state (e.g., Caney, 
2005 or Singer, 1972). The current international legal system favours the 
communitarian view with some global liberal aspirations, prominently espoused in 
human rights documents. A balance needs to be found, as neither approach is practical 
and morally defensible at the same time, and the dilemma of migrants drowning at sea 
poses a particular problem for Europe which has always emphasized its attachment to 
a more impartial human rights perspective (Gibney, 1999). “Extraterritorial asylum is 
essentially about reconciling the principle of territorial sovereignty with claims of 
humanitarianism” (Morgenstern, 1948: 236). The thesis demonstrates that the 
balancing of these two values is still biased towards a communitarian view, with 
progressive strides being made by the Courts in some areas. 
CHAPTER	  I:	  The	  Current	  Scheme	  of	  Refugee	  Protection	  in	  the	  
European	  Context	  
 
An analysis of the system of laws regulating and protecting refugee rights within the 
extraterritorial dimension of EU asylum policy is necessarily very complex and multi-
layered. Different levels of law need to be considered, the key instruments being the 
European Asylum System and Union Law, the Law of the Seas, International Human 
Rights and Refugee Conventions, and EU Human Rights Instruments (the Charter & 
Convention). This first Chapter focuses on the not explicitly human rights based 
systems of protection. The explicit human rights documents will be discussed in more 
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detail in Chapter 2 to offer a complementary approach for conceptualizing refugee 
rights and closing persisting gaps. 
 
1.1.	  The	  Common	  European	  Asylum	  System	  (CEAS)	  
 
The European Asylum Framework has developed rapidly in the last decade, from 
distinct national policies, over some minimum common standards agreed upon in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, towards the 2009 Stockholm Program where a common EU-
framed policy was initiated for the first time and subsequently embedded in the 
Lisbon Treaty. Articles 77(1)(c), 77(2)(d), 78(2)(g) and 79(1) TFEU call respectively 
for the adoption of measures in the sphere of integrated border management, the 
creation of partnerships with third countries for managing inflows of asylum seekers, 
measures relating to the prevention of illegal immigration, and measures relating to 
the prevention of trafficking of human beings. In light of these fast developments, this 
first section shall outline the most important features of the regulatory framework 
with a focus on the extraterritorial dimension. 
 
The basic tension at the heart of the current European regulatory framework 
concerned with migration and asylum is the tension between controlling migration 
flows, containing and managing them, and on the other hand protecting the rights of 
individuals in need of protection. There is a clear consensus that the current system is 
biased towards security concerns and reducing the flow of migration through ever 
increasing control and also criminalization of migration (Guild and Moreno-Lax, 
2013: 9, Cholewinski in Guild et al, 2012: 178, Huysmans, 2000: 751, Mitsilegas, 
2014). Moreover, there has been vehement criticism of the internal dimension as well, 
most notably, of the Dublin I-III regulations from many different sides3 and the 
European Parliament has called repeatedly for a “more holistic” approach to asylum 
and migration, most recently in December 2014 (2014/2907(RSP)). The European 
Commission announced in March 2015 its review of a comprehensive European 
Agenda on Migration, to be presented in May 2015. However, the focus of this review 
does not lie on protection of refugee rights but rather emphasizes “fighting irregular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3 See: https://internationalrefugeelaw.wordpress.com/2013/08/26/the-dublin-regulation-a-critical-
examination-of-a-troubled-system/ 
	  	   13	  
migration” (EUCOM, 4.3.2015) and does not address some of the key criticisms 
levied against the current system, such as the fact that individual claims to protection 
are often not assessed when the applicant originates from a country that is categorized 
as “safe” (Guild in Kneebone, 2014: 169). This trend is further underlined by the ten-
point plan4 issued by the European Commission after the Refugee Crisis Summit in 
April 2015. The points reflect a focus on control (combating the smugglers, 
increasing intelligence and more return programs) and do not significantly alter the 
mandate of the relevant Operations (Triton and Poseidon) to allow for effective rescue 
operations close to the Libyan Coast (EurActiv, 2015). The phrase contained in the 
very first point “within the mandate of Frontex” makes is clear that saving lives is not 
a priority, as this is not Frontex’ mandate.  
 
The current key elements and actors of the CEAS are the following5: 
 
1) The Qualification Directive (2011) clarifies the grounds on which international 
protection is granted to asylum-seekers. The criteria are directly based on the 
Geneva Refugee Convention. 
2) The Asylum Procedure Directive (2013) establishes common procedures for 
granting and withdrawing international protection, while strengthening the rights 
of asylum-seekers during the asylum procedure.  
3) The Reception Conditions Directive (2013) ensures a common standard in 
Member States for asylum-seekers' access to healthcare, education, employment, 
etc. It stipulates that detention is possible only as a last resort and for a period “as 
short as possible”. 
4) The Dublin III regulation (2013) establishes the criteria for determining which 
Member State is responsible for examining an application for international 
protection to avoid the phenomenon of 'refugees in orbit' (asylum-seekers for 
which no Member State takes responsibility) and to prevent multiple asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm 5 Due to limited scope, the more internally targeted legislations cannot be elaborated on in more detail, 
see for a broader analysis: Velluti, 2014, Chapter 3.  
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applications. By default the first Member State that the applicant entered is 
responsible.6 
5) Frontex: This Agency, founded in 2004, is tasked with securing the European 
external borders. It has gained much bad press for disrespecting human rights in its 
actions. Some of these concerns were at least nominally addressed in its 2011 
adoption of a code of human rights; nevertheless many of the problems persist and 
the basic problem of lacking accountability is not solved (Amnesty International, 
2014). 
6) The Common European Asylum Office (EASO), started to operate in 2010 and 
is meant to provide information about best practice in the field of asylum policies 
and also assist member states which come under particular stress through the 
Dublin system. It cooperates with the UNHCR. 
 
For this study, the Asylum Procedure Directive is of special interest as it clarifies 
the rights of refugees and the corresponding duties of the EU and its member states. 
The Directive establishes more procedural rights for an effective remedy and sets 
strict timeframes for the processing of asylum application (registration of application 
within 3 working days and length of a regular asylum procedure may not exceed 6 
months). The Directive establishes a wide reading of the principles of non-
refoulement but limits its scope of application in Article 3.1 to claims made in the 
territory or at the border. 
1.2	  Joint	  Operation	  Triton7	  
 
JO Triton is the Frontex-led successor for the Italian search and rescue operation 
Mare Nostrum and started its operations on 1 November 2014. It currently is the 
European external migration control and migrant protection mechanism and clearly 
deficient. Mare Nostrum had a budget of €9 million per month and deployed at any 
given time five Italian Navy ships with their air units and some 900 staff. It was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551333/EPRS_BRI%282015%29551333_
EN.pdf 7 The focus lies on JO Triton, as this replaced Mare Nostrum and leaves open the most deadly routes 
from Libya towards Italy. The other Frontex-led sea operation JO Poseidon is smaller and covers the 
Greek islands in the Aegean sea (plus Crete) and is also mandated with border control.  
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designed to maximize capacity to assist boats in distress, to host people in safety at 
sea, and to minimize time in port to disembark rescued people so that assets could be 
quickly back at sea to save others (Amnesty, 2015: 15). In contrast, JO Triton does 
not have rescue of migrants in distress as its prime mandate. This is reflected in its 
much narrower area of operation, only within 30 sea miles of the Italian coast. 
Frontex and other experts regard Triton’s budget, at €2.9 million per month, and its 
assets as adequate for its operational objectives, i.e. border control (ibid: 19). The 
current operation is consciously inadequate to rescue lives of migrants beyond the 
territorial waters of European countries. Civil society actors, such as the Migrant 
Offshore Aid Stations8 have started to fill this gap and saved thousands of lives. 
However, they face the problem of disembarking the migrants, as no state has the 
duty to accept them. However, this does not compensate adequately for the reluctance 
of European states and the EU to making migrants’ survival a true priority.  
 
1.3	  The	  Applicable	  Law	  of	  The	  Seas	  
 
Beyond the territorial waters and the Contiguous Zone and the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (where states may exercise certain control functions, viz. UNCLOS 33(1)), the 
Law of the Seas is applicable. The EU is a party to UNCLOS and all EU member 
states have ratified the convention as well. On the High Seas, the two principles of 
freedom of navigation and flag-state jurisdiction apply (UNCLOS Articles 92 and 94) 
and obligations for search & rescue are established for states and masters of ships in 
Article 98. This provision builds on similar provisions in the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the 1979 International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR). The SOLAS Convention obliges 
a State Party to rescue persons in distress “around its coasts” (SOLAS regulation 
V/7), whereas the SAR Convention requires that “assistance [is] provided to any 
person in distress at sea” (Chapter 2.1.10). None excludes the high seas from their 
scope in theory (Hartmann et al 2015). However, in practice, the search and rescue 
zones based established on these provisions are often inadequately patrolled and some 
states do not fulfil their obligations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8 http://moas.eu/ 
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Two further limitations emerge for refugee rights protection, in spite of the regime of 
search and rescue. Firstly, the old “Catch 22 of the Law of the Seas”, already 
commented upon during the Vietnamese exodus of boat people: “that the shipmaster 
of a freighter in international waters is obliged to rescue boat people/migrants in 
distress but no one is obliged to take in the refugees, once they have been rescued” 
(Pugash, 1977). This problem is magnified in the European context of supposed 
burden sharing. As a mirror image to the reluctance of member states to equally share 
the burden of taking in refugees within Europe, the burden of rescuing and processing 
refugee applications is also not equally shared. Examples abound of disputes between 
states about whose responsibility the migrants are, and as Search and Rescue (SAR) 
zones overlap and some states, e.g., Libya, are not willing and or able to fulfil their 
duties under the SAR Convention and the SOLAS, these disputes happen sometimes 
at the expense of the lives of refugees. The issue at the heart of the matter is indeed 
“where protection must be provided and by whom” (Guild and Moreno Lax, 2013: 
12). A prime example of the break-down of burden sharing that demonstrates the 
persisting flaws in the internal and external European asylum policies is Malta that 
illegally detains migrants, while claiming they are not Malta’s responsibility (DeBono 
in Dembour et al, 2011 and aida, 2015). 
 
Secondly, the scheme of protection offered to refugees under these conventions is 
limited to the obligation of non-refoulement and no specific rules of conduct or 
protection mechanisms are clearly installed. Moreover, the UNCLOS remains a very 
state centred convention, ill equipped to conceptualize the rights of vessels and people 
without a clear nationality and hence there are many gaps and much room for state 
discretion when relying on UNCLOS solely on the High Seas (Ryan and Mitsilegas, 
2010: 114). 
 
1.4	  In	  Focus:	  the	  principle	  of	  Non-­‐Refoulement	  
 
The principle of non-refoulement has always been the centrepiece of refugee 
protection. Article 78 TFEU establishes that the Union’s common policy on asylum 
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must be in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Refugee Convention) and other relevant treaties such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1984). 
This Article 78 also establishes the principle of non-refoulement as phrased in the 
Refugee Convention: 
 
Article 33 (1) 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion. 
 
The prohibition of refoulement is also contained in Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. The protection 
afforded by this Article of the ECHR, and also the similar ones in the ICCPR and the 
CAT, is absolute and there is no derogation possible.9 Article 19 of the EU 
Fundamental Rights Charter also prohibits refoulement. 
 
The key issue with this framing of non-refoulement is that it remains essentially 
territorial and is hence vulnerable to the charge of complete moral arbitrariness as it 
provides very different access to protection depending on whether refugees attempt to 
arrive by land or sea. However, the duty to not engage in refoulement once 
jurisdiction is established ratione personae and/or ratione loci has been established 
firmly by the ECtHR (see below). Moreover, it has been argued that this norm of non-
refoulement has gained the status of jus cogens (Farmer, 2009). Indeed, the norm of 
non-refoulement, in spite of the inherent erratic nature in which this rule is applied 
due to subjective assessments of consequences and dangers, can be seen as a 
revolutionary or “destabilizing” norm (Unger, 1986)10 as it has been applied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 ECtHR (GC) 2008: Saadi v. Italy, no 37201/06, paras 137-38. 10 In Unger’s theory, the central idea of destabilisation rights is „to provide a claim upon governmental 
power obliging government to disrupt those forms of division and hierarchy that, contrary to the spirit 
of the constitution, manage to achieve stability only by distancing themselves from the transformative 
conflicts that might disturb them” (Unger, 1986: 53).  
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extraterritorially and could thus function as a front-runner for other rights (Kelly in 
Dembour et al, 2011). The subsequent study of Hirsi shows how this progressive 
reading of this right took hold. 
 
	  1.5	  Case	  Study:	  Hirsi	  Jamaa	  and	  Others	  v	  Italy	  (ECtHR	  2012)	  
 
The Facts of the Case: The case concerned a group of about 200 Somali and Eritrean 
migrants en route from Libya to the Italian Coast on 6 May 2009. They were 
intercepted at sea by Italian authorities when they were already within the Maltese 
Search and Rescue Region and escorted back to Libya on Italian ships without having 
their cases examined. The operation was based on a bi-lateral agreement between 
Italy and Libya, signed in 2007 with an additional protocol in 2009, to conduct such 
push back operations. Two of the migrants died after this operation in undisclosed 
circumstances and 14 were granted refugee status by the UNHCR Office in Tripoli 
between June and October 2009.  
 
Decision and Reasoning: This was the first instance where a European Court ruled on 
an interception at sea case and the Grand Chamber found unanimously: 
-­‐ That “in the period between boarding the ships of the Italian forces and being 
handed over to the Libyan authorities, the applicants were under continuous and 
exclusive de jure and de facto control of the Italian authorities. (…) Accordingly, 
the events giving rise to the alleged violations fall within Italy’s jurisdiction 
within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention” (ECtHR, 2012, para. 81 and 
82). 
-­‐ That Italy violated Article 3 ECHR prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment 
on two counts (risk of ill-treatment in Libya and risk of repatriation from Libya to 
countries where ill-treatment is rife) and  
-­‐ That Italy violated Article 4 of Protocol no. 4 prohibiting collective expulsion and 
lastly,  
-­‐ That Italy violated Article 13 ECHR guaranteeing a domestic remedy for any 
arguable complaint of a violation of the Convention.  
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The Court relied on a wide range of materials, including statements by third parties, 
such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as assessments 
by civil society actors. Evidence provided by Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch was important for ascertaining the facts of the case and assessing the 
situation in Libya.  
 
Implications & Impact: The implications of this judgment are very significant in the 
context of extraterritorial refugee right protection as the Court firmly established the 
duty of states to abide by their obligations under European Union Asylum as well as 
Human Rights Law when exercising de jure or/and de facto jurisdiction. In a world 
where, “states are reluctant to accept responsibility for providing international 
protection when they engage in extraterritorial action” (Guild and Moreno-Lax, 2013: 
1), this was a milestone decision. Moreover, the judgment speaks directly to contested 
practices of mass expulsion more widely practiced by Frontex and must be seen as a 
clear case of interaction and dialogue between the Court, the EU legislative bodies, 
and national governments. In a time when questions around asylum are deeply 
politicized, the Court has assumed a very active and clear role, as will be argued more 
fully in the third chapter. The impact of the judgment was instantly visible in new 
proposed regulation for Frontex, issued by the Commission for consideration by the 
Parliament in 2013. The UNHCR commented on this piece of legislation and based 
itself heavily on the ruling in Hirsi, also drawing on CJEU11 case law, mainly M.S.S v 
Belgium and Greece, e.g., “UNHCR welcomes the inclusion of Article 4(2), which 
reflects the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the Hirsi judgment. The 
ECtHR concluded that the non-refoulement obligation under Article 3 ECHR requires 
the returning state to assess the treatment to which applicants for asylum would be 
exposed upon their return”(UNHCR, 2013: 4). The new regulation (No 656/2014) 
was enacted in April 2014 and the key points of Hirsi are clearly reflected in Article 
4. Lastly, it should be noted that the Court ended the judgment with a plea for more 
humanity and respect for human rights by citing Sale v. Haitian Centres Council: 
 
“Refugees attempting to escape Africa do not claim a right of admission to Europe. 
They demand only that Europe, the cradle of human rights idealism and the birthplace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In the interest of consistency the Court of Justice of the European Union is abbreviated with CJEU.  
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of the rule of law, cease closing its doors to people in despair who have fled from 
arbitrariness and brutality. That is a very modest plea, vindicated by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. ‘We should not close our ears to it’” (Hirsi, last 
paragraph). 
 
1.6	  The	  Persisting	  Gaps	  &	  Perverse	  Policy	  Incentives	  
 
There are a number of gaps in the European external asylum policies, most notably, a 
lack of clear rights protection on the high seas, as the main applicable framework 
remains the UNCLOS in this context, which in essence protects states’ freedom of 
navigation. This system of protection does not in itself regulate the powers a state may 
exercise vis-à-vis migrants (den Heijer, 2012: 240). EU human rights regimes and 
international human rights can supplement this protection regime, as has been 
demonstrated by the ECtHR in Hirsi. However, such an extraterritorial application of 
the ECHR hinges on the establishment of jurisdiction. More clarity is needed on actor 
responsibility in this nebulous zone of law and when exactly a jurisdictional link is 
activated between a state / the EU and migrants. Moreover, the CEAS instruments, 
while being constantly updated, still reflect a very territorial and control focused view 
of asylum policies, which does not mirror the reality and needs of refugees crossing 
the sea and does not sufficiently address the tragedies occurring before Europe’s 
shores. In spite of the increasing official ‘communitarization’ of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ) the inter-governmental and security bias, already 
identified over a decade ago (Geddes, 2000 and Guiraudon 2000), has persisted. 
 
Employing the logic of incentives (e.g., Downs, 1998) one may worry how the 
extension of state duties through judgments such as Hirsi will affect the willingness of 
states to engage migrants in distress on the high seas in a way that will risk 
establishing jurisdiction and hence also human rights duties. Arguably, the costs of 
rescue actions have risen sharply with this judgment and amended regulation. The 
very narrow and territorially focused scope of JO Triton could be seen as confirming 
this view. This analysis is supported by Cornelisse, who argues in the context of 
asylum and detention that “in a situation in which one’s presence on national territory 
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automatically leads to an entitlement to fundamental rights, the sovereign state may 
wish to keep people outside its territory in order not to have to accord them these 
fundamental rights” (Cornelisse, 2012: 131). 
 
Moreover, continued evasion tactics by governments, such as increased use of third 
state agreements and the redirecting of commercial vessels to assist migrants reflect 
the above mentioned gaps in the inter-play between UNCLOS and the EU external 
asylum system. Using commercial vessels perpetuates the responsibility evasion by 
states and reflects the underlying crisis concerning burden sharing amongst member 
states. In 2014, Italian authorities called on 700 mercantile vessels to help rescue 
about 40,000 migrants. One ship supplying oil platforms off the Libyan coast 
participated in 62 operations. As a result many commercial operators announced that 
they would change their routes (Moloney, 2015).  
 
While there surely is a rational element to these developments, the incentive to appear 
as a responsible and legitimate actor, the “logic of appropriateness” must not be 
underestimated, especially in the European context (Franck, 1998). Such a 
“compliance pull”, as conceptualized by Franck, can be observed in the EU states’ 
attempt to comply with the existing rules and can be deduced from firstly their 
willingness to adapt to the pronouncements by the ECtHR on the matter and secondly, 
by the EU’s self-conception as a “normative power”, which speaks to a true 
internalization of certain norms such as human rights through a transnational legal 
process (Koh, 1998). The main policy question that emerges is thus, how these values 
and rights can relate to extraterritorial asylum, on which basis the current system 
could be improved and how the incentives can be changed in such a way to make a) 
non-compliance with such a system more costly and/or b) compliance easier and more 
attractive. However, as we are concerned here with the role of the Courts, the question 
of the legal base for providing effective extraterritorial access to asylum is our focus. 
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CHAPTER	  II:	  Extending	  the	  Scheme	  of	  Protection:	  Human	  
Rights	  for	  Migrants	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  ECHR	  
 
In spite of advances in the protection of the rights of migrants and refugees, the 
scheme of protection currently offered by the EU is still insufficient. The system most 
fundamentally lets down the group of migrants who do not reach the shores of Europe 
or where states successfully avoid responsibility and no jurisdictional link can be 
established between a refugee/migrant and the state. Hence this chapter will analyse 
which human rights instruments offer the most substantial and also effective 
protection and how EU member states’ responsibility may be engaged to fill these 
gaps in the system of extraterritorial asylum.  
2.1	  Human	  Rights	  as	  the	  Foundation	  for	  a	  Better	  Protection	  Scheme	  
 
It should be self-evident that migrants have human rights. Yet, migrants find it very 
hard to access these rights (Dembour et al, 2011). This is so for a multitude of 
reasons, but a key factor is that, while rights exist, no clear obligations are established 
regarding their enforcement and protection. This is possibly the most glaring 
shortcoming of the Refugee Convention and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: they grant a right to seek asylum but establish no duties on states to grant 
asylum. This again reflects the state-centred view of asylum as relating to the national 
sovereignty of a state to control its own borders instead of conceptualizing asylum 
from the perspective of the refugee, whose human rights have to stand down when 
faced with a state’s sovereignty (Benhabib, 2004). This tension, between sovereign 
self-determination and universal principles of human rights is not easy to resolve. The 
only right that managed to transcend the boundary of state sovereignty so far has been 
the right of non-refoulement. 
 
However, human rights still remain the appropriate framing for these issues and they 
do retain a “restrained but radical potential” for change (Cornelisse, 2011: 112).  
Firstly, this holds true for conceptual reasons: Human rights, as debated and contested 
as they may be, still offer their original promise of rights and protection to everyone 
based on membership in the human race. The scope of these rights is unequivocally 
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stated at the start of the UNDHR: 
 
Art. 2 UNDHR 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional 
or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether 
it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty. (my emphasis) 
 
This passage speaks directly to the migrant experience of individuals who no longer 
enjoy the protection of a specific state. The one thing protection claims can be based 
on in these situations beyond jurisdiction is the migrants’ human rights. Crucial 
rights, which become relevant here are, amongst others: the right to life (Spijkerboer, 
2007), the right to identity (Grant, 2011), the right to seek/have asylum, the right to 
leave one’s country and the right to an effective remedy (Reneman, 2014). EU 
extraterritorial asylum policies endanger and often disregard these most fundamental 
rights. The challenge faced by Europe at the moment (and also other countries with 
pressured and very questionable asylum systems, such as the USA and Australia) is to 
prove Hannah Arendt wrong, who wrote in 1968: 
 
“The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human 
being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who had professed to 
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all 
other qualities and specific relationships – except they were still human. The world 
found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” (Arendt, 1968: 279). 
 
2.2	  Sources	  and	  Specific	  Instruments	  of	  Human	  Rights	  	  
 
In order to present a precise argument about which human rights should be protected 
better for migrants, a clarification of the conception of human rights used in this study 
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is in order. Dembour’s classification scheme of four broad schools is a useful starting 
point, although there is much overlap and this paper does not fit neatly into any one 
school. In Dembour’s scheme the “natural school” conceives of human rights as 
given, the “deliberative school” as agreed upon, the “protest school” as fought for, 
and the “discourse school” as talked about (Dembour, 2006). This author’s view of 
the origins of human rights is a mixture of the natural and deliberative school, where 
given and shared moral intuitions are codified and agreed upon to form a base of 
human rights to rely upon. This paper, however, also picks up the protest argument 
when it highlights the deficits of the current asylum policies and calls for better 
protection of migrants’ human rights. Lastly, there is a strong discursive element 
presented here in acknowledging the power of the language of human rights in the 
dialogue between The Courts and between The Courts and legislatures. 
 
In our case, there are three instruments of human rights protection, which may apply 
to migrants on the high seas: international human rights conventions, the EU Charter 
applied extraterritorially and the ECHR applied extraterritorially. There are different 
advantages and limitations to all three of these sources of human rights. 
 
International	  Human	  Rights	  Covenants	  
 
International Covenants have the advantage that they are not limited to a specific 
jurisdiction of a state and thus offer rights to migrants everywhere. The Refugee 
Convention, the UDHR, the ICCPR as well as more specialised conventions such as 
the Convention against Torture (CAT) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
all inspire the ECHR and Union law. However, they also have significant weaknesses: 
firstly, there is the general problem of enforcement of these conventions directly and 
secondly, the conventions do not sufficiently conceptualize states’ duties beyond their 
borders and thirdly, the EU has yet not ratified or acceded to a UN human rights 
treaty, with the exception of the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities.  
 
Hence these treaties usually form a source of inspiration for the CJEU and the 
ECtHR, which have their own respective human rights instruments and each other to 
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consider first. Arguably, this should be different in the case of asylum procedures, as 
Article 78(2) TFEU is exceptional in its wording by requiring that EU legislation be 
interpreted “in accordance with” the relevant international treaties. Indeed the CJEU 
has followed this interpretation of Article 78 by ensuring that the Refugee Convention 
be used to interpret the Qualification Directive in Salahadin Abdullah and B and D. 
However, it is unsurprising that the ECHR and the Charter are more important 
sources for the European Courts, especially as both instruments incorporate and 
expand on many elements in international covenants. When analysed, the Charter and 
ECHR offer more protection than international Covenants, or certainly no less 
(Reneman, 2014). Hence we shall focus on a comparison of these two instruments. 
 
The	  European	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  
	  
The Charter is very interesting as it provides in many instances a broader reading of 
refugee rights than any other instrument. Most notably it grants a right to asylum: 
 
Article 18 
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status 
of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
 
The formulation “due respect” is significant here as it is used instead of “in 
accordance with” the Convention and Protocol, as set out in Article 78 TFEU. This 
emphasizes the independent character of the Charter, which may establish with this 
right a much more substantial right to asylum than the ECHR or the Refugee 
Convention (Peers in Kneebone et al, 2012). This right is reflected in the 
Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU) and hence Union law and applicable to member 
states (see Article 51 on the Scope of the Charter). Yet, the CJEU has not 
conclusively explained how this right to asylum should be interpreted. The Court 
evaded answering such questions when they were referred to it in Halaf. However, it 
is clear that this right to “asylum status” is not absolute and will be balanced against 
the interest of the community (Reneman, 2014: 4). 
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The Charter may also provide a wider scope of protection than other human rights 
instruments because it specifically mentions citizens’ rights. Applying the a contrario 
method of legislative interpretation, we could conclude that all the provisions of the 
Charter which are not expressly limited in personal scope must apply equally to EU 
citizens and non-citizens alike (Peers in Guild et al, 2012: 446, Velluti, 2014:28). 
However, the CJEU has so far refrained from establishing clear extraterritorial 
application of fundamental rights beyond the prohibition on refoulement (viz. N.S. v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department). A reluctance to extend domestic levels 
of protection to extraterritorial situations also emerges from a careful analysis of 
recent CJEU case law by Costello and Moreno-Lax, who predict that the Court will 
evade establishing a dual standard of protection by not applying fundamental human 
rights to extraterritorial situations in the first place (Costello and Moreno-Lax in 
Peers, 2014). 
 
Combined with this assessment of the current stance of the CJEU comes the 
institutional handicap that individual petition remains very difficult and even more 
difficult when such a petition is based on human rights as individual concern will be 
very difficult to prove (Chalmers et al, 2014). Additionally, the CJEU can only review 
human rights issues when they pertain to the application of or derogation from Union 
law. Thus a situation has emerged in which the CJEU’s supranational strong judicial 
review is used in the field of human rights “in a belated and bridled fashion and not to 
its maximal potential”, whereas the ECtHR’s international judicial review has 
developed and emancipated in the course of fifty years into “strong judicial review, 
solely focused on human rights, that goes beyond its strictly legal jurisdiction” 
(Besson, 2011: 122).  
 
The	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
 
The ECHR is the most promising base for engaging extraterritorial human rights 
obligations for three main reasons, in spite of the EU’s delayed accession to it. Firstly, 
the expressed willingness of the ECtHR to extend Contracting States’ obligations also 
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towards the high seas and a progressing interpretation of the meaning of jurisdiction 
under Article 1 of the Convention. Secondly, the necessary distinction between the 
concepts of jurisdiction and state responsibility. Thirdly, the assertive role taken by 
the ECtHR in extending the human rights regime of the Convention and the 
institutional possibility of individual petition that has transformed the Court into one 
of the main actors in safeguarding human rights in the European context.  
 
The problem of a possible legal vacuum or terra nullius on the high seas has been 
acknowledged by the ECtHR. In Medvedyev, which concerned the boarding and 
subsequent seizure and arrest of a vessel and its crew on the high seas during an anti-
drug trafficking operation, the Court considered this incident to fall within the ambit 
of Article 5 ECHR and notes more generally in its judgment that “the special nature 
of the maritime environment (…) cannot justify an area outside of the law where 
ships’ crews are covered by no legal system capable of affording them enjoyment of 
the rights and guarantees protected by the Convention which the States have 
undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction, any more than it can 
provide offenders with ‘safe haven’” (ECtHR, 2008: para 81). 
 
Moreover, as was shown above with Hirsi, the Court has established extraterritorial 
obligations of human rights in a number of cases already, drawing an ever clearer 
picture of what jurisdiction amounts to in Loizidou, Al-Saadoon, Al-Skeini, and 
Medvedyev. As jurisdiction is commonly seen as the threshold criterion for the 
application of human rights duties on the part of state actors, much has been written 
on the factual tests regarding the establishment of jurisdiction. Interestingly, the 
criterion for the ECHR to apply (Article 1) is not territorial at all, but functional: it 
pertains to the function of jurisdiction. Contrary to this, Besson argues that, from a 
theoretical point of view, jurisdiction is best understood as “de facto political and 
legal authority” (Besson, 2012: 7). This focus on the normative dimension of the 
exercise of power, however, stands in contradiction to the universal claim of human 
rights. These rights are not merely to be observed based on common membership 
within a certain legitimate order. They are based on being human and obligations to 
observe these rights should be engaged, as has been argued by the ECtHR, once 
effective control is given. An interesting question emerging from the ruling in 
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Bankovic is whether increasing drone surveillance and de facto control of the 
Mediterranean through Frontex technology would amount to such control.  
It is unlikely that the parameters of effective control will be shifted significantly 
beyond Bankovic to include drone surveillance in spite of ambiguous case law.	  12 
However, the option of a functional framing of jurisdiction already moves beyond the 
exclusively territorial understanding of state responsibility, even though a 
Westphalian bias is still clearly present (Cornelisse, 2011). It has given rise to the 
claim that European states are to be held responsible for the actions of third parties 
such as private agencies and third countries when they effectively carry out EU 
policy.13 This interpretation is made more plausible when considering other case law 
by the ECtHR in which “effective control” was not seen in such a strict sense as 
Bankovic would imply. Thus, in Isaak, the proximity of the Turkish troops to the 
incident and their omission to protect the applicant’s life, were enough for the Court 
to rule that Turkey had incurred guilt because these troops “manifestly failed to take 
preventive measures to protect the victim’s life” (Isaak v. Turkey, para. 119). 
Moreover, in Treska the Court seems to endorse a broad reading of positive 
extraterritorial obligations when it states that: 
 
“even in the absence of effective control of a territory outside its borders, the State 
still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, 
economic, judicial and other measures that it is in its power to take and are in 
accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention.” (Treska v. Albania and Italy, p. 12). 
 
The extent of positive obligations beyond the territory of signatory states to the 
Convention is thus not conclusively determined by the Court and passages such as 
this one from Treska could form a convincing base for positive duties towards 
migrant protection on the high seas. It is the responsibility of the European Courts to 
clarify these duties further. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12 http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-decides-al-skeini-and-al-jedda/ 13 Viz den Heijer: “when European states endeavor to control the movement of asylum seekers outside 
their territories, they remain responsible under international law for possible wrong-doings ensuing 
from their sphere of activity.” (den Heijer, 2012: 1) 
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Additionally, the concepts of state responsibility and jurisdiction need to be 
distinguished more precisely, arguably more precisely than the Court has done in its 
past case law on the matter (Milanovic, 2011: 41-53). The concepts refer to different 
sources of international state responsibility, the concrete treaty under question (the 
ECHR) and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. If we look at the matter through 
the ILC’s conceptual framework, attribution is an issue under Article 2(a) of the ILC 
Articles (is the conduct that of the relevant state?), while jurisdiction is an issue under 
Article 2(b) (did the conduct breach an obligation of the state, i.e. did that obligation 
even apply to that particular conduct?)14 The distinctness of the two concepts was 
confirmed by the Court in Jaloud (para. 154): “The Court reiterates that the test for 
establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has 
never been equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act under general international law”. Even though the 
attribution question always features as part of the jurisdiction establishment process, it 
is useful to frame the issue more precisely and use the ILC Articles to establish clear 
lines of attribution of non-state migration control actors, such as private border 
agency personnel, to establish a jurisdictional link.  
 
Even with this limited extension of human rights to migrants beyond the territory of 
European states, the ECtHR has emerged as the most assertive Court in tackling the 
problem of engaging states’ responsibility for protecting the human rights of 
migrants. Moreover, even to the most idealist observer, it must be clear that Europe 
cannot impose on itself binding human rights obligations for effective access to 
asylum on all of the high seas as this would lead to a collapse of internal European 
institutions, while possibly establishing an undesirable pull factor for irregular 
migration that may endanger the lives of migrants even more. Hence a balance must 
be struck between rights protection and protection of the system that made such rights 
guarantees possible in the first place (Guild and Moreno-Lax 2013).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14 http://www.ejiltalk.org/jurisdiction-attribution-and-responsibility-in-jaloud/#more-12706 
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CHAPTER	  III:	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  European	  Courts	  	  
 
It has emerged from the analysis above that the European Courts, most notably, the 
European Court of Human Rights are key actors in interpreting and expanding the 
scope of human rights protection available to migrants. They have even been labelled 
“regional refugee law courts” (Velluti, 2014: 77). An argument has already been 
presented about the potential of the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court to extend such a 
rights scheme. This section will elaborate on this and place the role of the CJEU and 
the ECtHR in the theoretical context of two concepts: constitutional dialogues and 
judicial activism. This paper seeks to extend the US American origins of the idea of 
constitutional dialogue and apply it to the more complex and multi-dimensional 
European reality to include various contemporaneous dialogues. These dialogues exist 
between the ECtHR and the CJEU and the national constitutional courts, between the 
two Courts, between the CJEU and other EU institutions, between the ECtHR and 
Council as well as the EU institutions and also, crucially between Civil Society agents 
and the two Courts. A better understanding of them will not only elucidate the 
important (political) role the Courts occupy but also highlight important linkages to 
mobilize in favour of increased rights protection and identify pressure points for 
strategic litigation.  
 
While the limited scope of this study does not permit an in depth analysis of all of 
these complex relationships, the broad argument presented here is that the analytic 
lens of dialogue analysis is under-used in charting the influence of the European 
Courts. This is especially true of the ECtHR, which may reflect a wider deficit in 
scholarly understanding of that Court when compared to CJEU scholarship 
(Christoffersen et al, 2011: 3). Rather, the focus has been on “activism”, a perennial 
concern where the judiciary is concerned (Dawson et al, 2013) and section 3.2 will 
address this issue briefly.  
3.1	  Constitutional	  Dialogues	  
 
The notion of constitutional dialogues, a phenomenon much more debated in the US 
American and Canadian context, has only recently been applied to the European 
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situation (e.g. Dawson, 2013). While the parallels between the two settings are 
imperfect, as the EU is supra-national and much more complex, the notion of dialogue 
is a very useful analytical frame to understand the dynamics between the various 
actors involved in the creation of European asylum policies. Since the Charter became 
binding in 2009, even more has been made of an increasing constitutionalization of 
the European legal system (Alter, 2009: 288, Ritterberg and Schimmelfenning, 2007). 
This section aims to show how the dialogue over fundamental rights of a 
constitutional character, or general principles of an unwritten constitution, emerged 
over the last decades. It is argued that this is not only a crucial dialogue between the 
courts and the legislative institutions of the EU, but extends beyond that and should 
include an analysis of further relevant stakeholders such as civil society actors. This 
study shall not focus on the relationship between national constitutional courts and the 
ECtHR or national courts and the CJEU, as much good scholarship exists on these 
important links.15 Rather, the focus will be, firstly on the dialogue between the two 
Courts, and then focus on the remarkable influence of the ECtHR on EU legislation, 
also indirectly through the CJEU. This dimension of the dialogue is not as well 
developed in the literature as the dialogue between the CJEU and EU institutions 
itself.   
 
On the relationship between the two Courts in the area of fundamental human rights 
protection, a convincing argument has been presented to the effect that they have been 
mutually empowered vis-à-vis national institutions through their cooperation and 
developed a “strategic interdependence” (Scheeck, 2011: 164). Because the CJEU has 
constantly built up its jurisdiction, the ECtHR was able to become bolder in the 
exercise of its own review powers. Conversely, it is because EU member states are so 
closely scrutinized by the ECtHR in the human rights context that the CJEU has had 
to strengthen its own control mechanisms in this space (Besson, 2011: 120). In fact, 
the direct dialogue between the two Courts has flourished in the last decades and has 
been built up through determined individuals (Scheeck, 2009). The ECtHR only 
started in the mid-1990s to rule on EU-related cased and supported the CJEU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 viz. e.g., Alter, K.J. (2009) The European Court’s Political Power; Dawson, M., De Witte, B., Muir, 
E. (eds.) (2013) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice; Krisch, N. (2008) The Open 
Architecture of European Human Rights Law. Also: the JURISTRAS Project viz. Anagnostou, D. and 
Millns, S. (2010) 
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preliminary reference system through key judgments such as Soc Divagsa v Spain and 
Fritz and Nana v France. It also cites CJEU rulings and also the Charter in its own 
work, viz. Pellegrin v. France or Goodwin v. the UK. Conversely, the CJEU has 
relied heavily on the ECHR as a key source of inspiration for its own fundamental 
rights adjudication before it had its own instrument. Already since 1975, individual 
articles of the ECHR were mentioned by the CJEU, and the Charter and the ECHR 
feature prominently next to each other in key judgments such as Kadi.  
 
A continued strong dialogue on these matters between the Courts is desirable, as it 
harmonizes and strengthens the fundamental rights granted in Europe and also 
strengthens supra-national judicial review in a context where it is increasingly 
challenged by national legislatures and constitutional courts. However, the 
relationship clearly stands at a crossroads. The CJEU asserted the importance of 
fundamental rights within the EU rather late, arguably against the will of the original 
Treaty drafters (de Burca, 2011) and thus expanded its “enhanced constitutional 
mandate” (Muir, 2011: 78), while creating a parallel structure of human rights 
protection in the European system. The delayed accession to the ECHR by the EU, in 
spite of the obligation to accede contained in Article 6(2) TEU, may not bode well for 
the dialogue between the two institutions, nor does the fact that the CJEU now 
favours its own instrument, the Charter, over the ECHR (de Burca, 2013). Preserving 
the autonomy of the EU legal order is a key concern of the CJEU and member states 
alike and this may threaten the position of the ECHR and ECtHR, which would be 
harmful for migrant interests, as this is the most promising system of protection, as 
outlined above.  
 
So far, the influence of the ECtHR on EU legislation has been remarkable. Contrary 
to the intuitive assumption that the EU system is more powerful, ECtHR norms have 
progressively been super-imposed in the field of asylum protection over EU norms 
within the EU itself, even in the absence of formal institutional linkages between the 
EU and the Council of Europe (Scheeck, 2011: 164). The influence of Hirsi on the 
amended Frontex regulation was already mentioned as a prime example of a direct 
dialogue between the EU legislative/executive and the ECtHR. Indeed, the European 
Commission asked repeatedly for clarification on matters such as the circumstances 
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under which states incur responsibility under international refugee law (COM(2006) 
733 final, esp. paras. 31-35) or concerning the rules applicable to maritime controls 
(COM(2009) 262 final). In addition to this, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe also repeatedly highlighted the need for addressing migration 
control measures (Resolution 1821, 2011). The Court’s answer to these questions and 
clear rejection of mass expulsions, or “push backs”, have had a profound impact on 
EU policies and the dialogue will have to continue concerning the currently promoted 
“pull back” and readmission agreements with countries (e.g. Ukraine and Turkey) 
where safety of refugees is at least contested, if not manifestly absent (O’Nions, 
2014). 
 
Turning to the influence of civil society actors on these dialogues, the ECHR system 
is currently more promising to extend more protection to migrants, as it has a long-
standing tradition of NGO involvement and even direct litigation (Hodson, 2011). 
Such an involvement of civil society is less developed or institutionally possible at the 
CJEU.16 Cichowski has shown, through a careful analysis of cases brought against 
Turkey and the UK respectively, the crucial influence of NGOs before the ECtHR 
both as litigants and as a resource to establish the facts of a case (Cichowski, 2011). 
The ECtHR has expanded the possibility for such involvement through developing an 
“indirect victim” approach that enables people who were not directly affected to bring 
a claim if they are close relatives or have a valid personal interest to have a violation 
confirmed.17 Some see in this development an opening for even more NGO 
participation in the future (Vajic in Treves et al, 2005). Human Rights organizations 
already often submit amicus curiae briefs in cases they consider strategically 
important and are often instrumental to the functioning of the Court, e.g., in the 
landmark case Soering, the amicus brief submitted by Amnesty International was 
quoted extensively in the final judgment. Given this established relationship and the 
challenges faced at the CJEU, it is both likely and also strategically preferable that the 
continued balancing between migrant rights and EU border securitization will be 
carried out before the ECtHR.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16 See e.g., Bogojevic, S. (2013) 'CJEU, can you hear me? Access to Justice in Environmental Matters' 
(2013) 16 Europarättslig Tidskrift 728-740. 17 See e.g., Aksoy v Turkey (2000) where the claim was brought by the victim’s father with assistance 
from a Kurdish Human Rights Group, the KHRP. 
	  	   34	  
3.2	  A	  Note	  on	  Judicial	  Activism	  	  
 
There is neither the scope nor the need to review the vast literature on judicial 
activism here.18 The argument presented is that the charge of judicial activism is 
misplaced in the context of fundamental rights. This is so because, if we “take rights 
seriously” (Dworkin, 1988), then they are part of the very foundation of a liberal 
democracy and should not be determined by a simple vote of majority but rather be 
seen as the very precondition for the exercise of equal democratic participation, as 
argued by Habermas (Habermas in Baxter, 2011). Moreover, the idea of government 
by judges misses an important distinction in political theory. This is the distinction 
between arguments of principle on the one hand and arguments of policy on the other. 
Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances 
or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole. “Arguments of 
principle justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures 
some individual or group right” (Dworkin, 1998: 107). Especially in the context of 
migration, the courts have a vital role to play in establishing and safeguarding the 
principles derived from rights against arguments of efficiency and political realism 
that is often poorly disguised xenophobia (Dembour, 2015). 
 
The main point is that courts are meant to be active in protecting rights. In fact that is 
their stated purpose and also self-conception, as shown in the the self-identification of 
the ECtHR as the “conscience of Europe” (Council of Europe, 2010). Thus, it should 
be highlighted here that the scope of the Charter (Article 51) states that the document 
is addressed to the “institutions and bodies of the Union”. The CJEU, being the 
institution most intuitively in charge of protecting fundamental rights does have a 
clear mandate for such protection. The role of the ECtHR is equally clearly phrased in 
Article 19 ECHR as: “To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by 
the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.” The real 
question at hand is whether the Courts are active enough in fulfilling this role. 
 
Refugee and migrant rights protection highlights the tension between state 
sovereignty and individual human rights. A balancing of these interests in favour of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 For a powerful critique see: Waldron, J. (2006) The Core Case Against Judicial Review. 
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more rights protection at the expense of sovereignty will be unpopular with states and 
legislatures. This has led some observers to claim that the judiciary has to perform 
this role (Velluti, 2014: 70). 
3.3	  How	  progressive	  are	  the	  Courts?	  	  
	  
Progressive is taken here to mean progressively protecting the rights of refugees and 
the human rights of migrants. By extending and reaffirming protective obligations 
once jurisdiction is established by a state and by establishing minimum conditions of 
rights protection within the Dublin System (MSS and NS), both Courts have 
progressively expanded the rights of migrants/refugees. A comparative case law 
analysis leads Velluti to conclude that the activism of both courts, especially also of 
the CJEU, is successfully “filling in the lacunae of EU asylum legislation” (Velluti, 
2014: 100). 
However, the overall assessment is mixed when the persisting rights violations (e.g. in 
migrant detention) and the deplorable condition of many non-citizens within the 
Union as well as the border deaths are taken into account. Dembour has highlighted in 
a recent study the persisting deficiencies while arguing that the European system of 
refugee and migrant protection suffers from a conceptual bias towards the rights of 
the state over the rights of the individuals (Dembour, 2015). When contrasted with the 
clear pro homine approach of the Inter-American Court, the Strasbourg system tends 
to see the migrant not primarily as an alien in need but rather as an alien subject. This 
focus on state (territorial) control and the prerogative of state sovereignty vis-à-vis 
human rights has already been identified as a key deficiency within the ECHR system 
which was primarily designed to protect the rights of citizens. 
 
Concrete ways in which such a more progressive stance could be developed by the 
Court would mainly hinge on the application of Articles 3, 6 and 14 of the 
Convention, as these are well developed in migrant case law but could be taken 
further to ensure protection (Dembour, 2015). Currently the threshold for proving 
inhuman and degrading treatment is very high and could be lowered given the many 
instances in which such treatment has been documented in the migration context 
(Amnesty International, 2014). The Maaouia judgment had a detrimental effect on the 
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right to fair trial for migrants and should be reversed, while effective access to judicial 
review remains a core challenge. Procedural questions are just as central to 
establishing a more progressive protection scheme and here much could be done to 
lower the hurdles migrants face in accessing the justice system in the first place. In 
this instance, the burden of proof could be lowered in certain circumstances and 
NGOs could be involved even more in establishing the facts of a case and friendly 
settlements without admission of a violation should not be accepted to name a few 
salient improvement measures. In the meantime, NGOs should bring strategic 
litigation to press these reforms and force the Court to establish clearer lines of 
accountability for states in extraterritorial situations. 
 
3.4	  Constraints	  and	  Restraint:	  How	  Progressive	  Can	  the	  Courts	  Be?	  	  
 
The European Courts are limited in a number of ways in extending the protection 
offered to migrants and potential refugees. Firstly, there is limited jurisdiction: the 
CJEU can only pronounce on matters of Union law and while this area has been 
progressively expanded, there are limits on this based on the principle of conferral 
contained in Article 5 TEU. Secondly, there is limited enforcement capacity. With 
regard to the CJEU this is most critical in the gap between jurisdiction of the court 
and capacity of EU legislatures (Dawson, 2013: 386). For the ECtHR the problem is 
even more acute with no control over the enforcement of its pronouncements and 
slow compliance. The ECtHR is also facing a severe case-load crisis, leading some 
observers to question its continued ability to provide individual justice (Keller et al., 
2010). Lastly, the two Courts have to consider their standing and legitimacy in the 
eyes of other political actors and tread carefully in order to maintain their normative 
power. Nevertheless, both Courts have been “active” in expanding their roles, also in 
the field of migration, and “have been creative even in cases where there is no 
consensus among Contracting Parties” (Besson, 2011: 107). This is especially true of 
the ECtHR and it arguably enjoys a special role in promoting more assertive human 
rights protection in Europe in spite of its original role of providing a minimum level 
of protection (Butti, 2013). Similar trends of assertiveness can also be seen on the part 
of the CJEU in areas such as terrorism policy review (Gearty, 2014).  
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The analysis of the legal instruments available to the Courts has shown that the scope 
for extraterritorial protection of migrant and refugee rights is limited by the inherently 
territorial understanding of protective duties that prevails in the current legal system 
and international relations. While migrants have human rights, it is very difficult to 
establish clear positive duties, based on law, as opposed to morality, for states to offer 
protection beyond their own borders / territorial waters. This stance is also reflected in 
the ‘wet foot / dry foot’ policy of the United States or the offshore migration control 
program run by Australia (Reneman, 2011). European legal instruments, the 
Convention and Charter, have been interpreted to have a wider application. However, 
they fall short of establishing positive duties beyond existing SAR duties or Operation 
Triton. From a policy perspective it may indeed be undesirable to establish such 
duties, as they may lead to vastly increased migration streams and be a pull factor for 
even more unsafe crossings. From a humanitarian perspective, it seems completely 
morally arbitrary why a person should enjoy less access to asylum and human rights 
protection simply based on her place of origin. Legally, states can currently be held 
liable in the ECHR system for human rights violations once they have established a 
sufficiently clear jurisdictional link or a “sufficiently direct link between the applicant 
and the damage alleged”, as contained in ECHR, Art. 34. Interestingly, this Article 
also states that individual applications may be brought “because of actions or 
omissions by a state”. Following Treska and with the planned increase in maritime 
patrols, the Courts may make more out of an omission to assist and protect. However, 
it is unlikely that a true duty to protect refugees on the high seas in the form of 
positive obligations to go and search for refugees will ever emerge. Hence, the 
questions will focus on how far states are responsible for the extraterritorial 
dimensions of asylum policies. 
 
Given the charges of judicial activism levied against the European Courts and a 
popular turn against increased migration flows, there is a renewed and mounting 
“ambient pressure to stem the tide” (Sedley, 2002: 322). It is exactly in such a climate 
of popular fear and state reluctance to take responsibility for human rights protection, 
that the judiciary should balance these trends, and protect the rights which societies 
have committed to, also for people of a different citizenship.  
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3.4	  Outlook	  on	  Future	  Challenges:	  Balancing	  Rights	  &	  Effective	  Policy	  	  
 
This study identifies four challenge clusters emerging for the two Courts in the field 
of extraterritorial asylum and human rights protection for migrants and refugees. 
Firstly, striking the right balance between efficiency and justice will be important, 
especially for the ECtHR, given its primary role in migration adjudication and 
persisting caseload crisis. Given the truth in the statement that “justice delayed is 
justice denied”, this is the most urgent dilemma, which needs to be addressed. An 
inefficient Court will lose relevance and a Court that prioritizes efficiency too much 
over justice loses its functional identity. Given the increasing number of migration 
cases, ad hoc tribunals and potentially pilot judgments could be solutions to this 
problem (Reneman, 2014).  
 
Secondly, the Courts will have to continue to scrutinize the extraterritorial activities 
of migration control by the EU and member states carefully and make sure that 
human rights, such as the right to leave, are not infringed by third country “pull back” 
agreements. Moreover, dialogue with EU institutions should continue about what 
constitutes a safe place and critique agreements with countries lacking sound asylum 
regulations themselves (e.g. Morocco). Current EU Joint Resettlement Programs, 
Regional Protection Programs, Protected Entry Procedures and other offshore 
processing plans need to be reviewed through the lens of human rights protection. 
Working closely with NGOs in the field will enable the Courts to reach better-
informed and more efficient judgments.  
 
Thirdly, the two Courts will have to continue to grapple with extraterritorial state 
responsibility to protect and respect human rights in a context of increasing control of 
the Mediterranean and under-developed SAR duties (Amnesty, 2015). Reconsidering 
the linkage between drone activity and control may be in order as well as a conceptual 
clarification of the applicable legal standards of state responsibility under 
international law, the Convention and the Charter. A key challenge in this field is that 
the legal standards are contested (Reneman, 2014: 195). As the extraterritorial 
dimension of EU migration control is also in an emerging state, this is a significant 
opportunity for the Courts to establish clear standards, extend their role and relevance, 
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and influence the shape of these policies through continuous dialogue. 
 
The last challenge will be clarifying the relationship between the two Courts and the 
two human rights protection systems of the Convention and the Charter. The Courts 
have achieved remarkable results and institutional strength through cooperation. Now, 
this relationship has entered a new phase and it remains to be seen what this means 
for refugee and migrant right protection. If a drifting apart of the Courts and an 
increased focus on the Charter and CJEU case law in Luxembourg should emerge, 
this could possibly be detrimental to the progress made by the ECtHR in extending 
protection duties. Clearly, a divergence of the two systems is undesirable, as it would 
not help in creating a clear legal base to protect human rights for migrants. Moreover, 
the Courts face individual challenges and given the prominence given here to the 
ECtHR it is worth highlighting the challenges which will emanate from the changed 
admissibility criteria and the new pilot judgment procedure.19 
 
CONCLUSION	  
 
This thesis has attempted to further a structural understanding of the deaths of 
migrants we are witnessing before Europe’s shores. It has demonstrated in the first 
chapter that the CEAS, while increasingly well developed, suffers from the limitations 
inherent to a territorial understanding of rights. While better rights protection has been 
advanced for migrants within Europe, effective access to asylum before migrants 
reach European shores is not included. An increasing use of private agents, such as 
commercial ships, and offshore migration processing are all symptoms of 
responsibility evasion by European states in the extraterritorial dimension of asylum 
policies. Moreover, the existing sea operations beyond the borders of the EU are 
focused explicitly on controlling the border and not on rescuing lives. Other rescue 
provisions such as contained in the UNCLOS, SAR or SOLAS are also insufficient, 
as they are primarily aimed at inter-state encounters and presuppose a functioning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/07/09/radical-but-risky-changes-afoot-at-the-european-court-of-
human-rights-andrew-tickell/ 
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cooperation between the Mediterranean countries for search and rescue. This is not 
given at the moment and migrants will continue to die during the dangerous crossing.  
 
The case study of Hirsi shows how the Court in Strasbourg has started to address this 
responsibility gap. The judgment effectively declared “push-back” operations to be 
illegal. However, this apparent progress may well have had a regressive impact on 
policy by raising the costs of rescue operations. However, it pointed to the importance 
of human rights in this context and the promise they may hold for migrants. 
  
Thus, the paper analysed which legal instruments could extend the scheme of rights 
protection available to migrants on the high seas and identified the ECHR as the most 
promising base for such rights. By analysing the institutional mechanisms and case 
law, it becomes apparent that the ECHR system has much potential to protect 
migrants’ human rights better and beyond European borders. Its functional 
interpretation of jurisdiction may turn out to be especially interesting in a climate of 
increasing control over the Mediterranean. However, if the Court does not reverse 
Bankovic, jurisdiction will remain tied to concrete sea operations. Positive duties of 
assistance may be even harder to establish and will remain ultimately a matter of 
political will and humanitarian action. Ideally, European states would develop a 
similar rationale to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – to protect refugees in this 
case to avoid migrant deaths at sea.  
 
The Courts are often underestimated as actors in the realm of extraterritorial asylum 
policies. By outlining the dialogue between the two main European Courts and the 
ECtHR and the EU legislative bodies, this paper has shown how the Courts have 
progressively expanded their sphere of influence and how the ECtHR affirmed its 
position as the main adjudicator of human rights. Hence it is the responsibility of the 
ECtHR and the CJEU to bring more clarity into states’ extraterritorial obligations 
towards migrants. Moreover the ECtHR has deferred to states’ sovereignty to control 
their borders, often at the expense of migrants. Effective access to asylum may in the 
present circumstances, where so few legal routes towards asylum in the EU exist, be 
crucially dependent on effective rescue operations with a wide regional mandate. The 
Courts could be more assertive in this area, as it is their role to progressively realize 
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the rights granted in the Charter and Convention 
 
In spite of the many challenges facing the two Courts, they have a very important role 
to play in safeguarding human rights in Europe’s growing extraterritorial asylum 
dimension. The migration dilemma, cast into high relief by the deaths in the 
Mediterranean, tests the human rights commitment of the EU and affects its 
legitimacy as a normative actor. The Courts, as guardians of fundamental rights, 
should remind states and the EU of these commitments and realize the potential of 
human rights for everyone, including migrants. 
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